During the period 2000-2004 central banks sustained a generalized reduction in their staff, which was accompanied, in most cases, with significant increases in staff costs. This could obey to an enhanced interest of central banks in focusing on their core functions. In fact, central banks have changed the ways they perform their operative functions (e.g. currency operations, payment systems operation, printing notes, etc.) through different strategies aimed at gathering the participation of third parties. These strategies differ according to the relationship that central banks have with the financial sector and the government, as well as to their historical tradition and modernization trend. To explain the effect of these changes on the staff, we estimated a short-term labor demand function for 66 central banks using a panel data model with random effects. Results indicate that central banks' labor demand is strongly determined by the country's population, economic development level and changes in operative functions, as well as by staff costs. In addition, we found a low employment-wage elasticity suggesting the presence of a flexible budgetary constrain in central banks.
INTRODUCTION
people, whereas Chile's had under 600. These differences also persist in some other developing countries, (e.g., Thailand's central bank operates with about 4,500 employees and Bulgaria's with around 1,000).
The empirical evidence suggests that these differences do not reside exclusively on the size of the population or the characteristics of the economy but also on the number of functions developed by central banks (Vaubel, 1997; . In an extensive work, Banco de la República (2005) has studied the functions carried out by 133 central banks and found out that operative functions (i.e., financial supervision, cash distribution, operation of retail payment systems, and banknotes printing) are more labor-intensive and therefore have the greatest impact on labor demand at central banks.
From the theoretical standpoint, staff costs should be taken into account when estimating labor demand (Hamermesh, 1993) . To this respect, Brione (2005) compared the staff costs of 28 OECD central banks, and found wide differences (e.g., the central banks of Austria, Italy and Poland have an average cost per employee three times higher than that of the central banks of New Zealand, Ireland and the Czech Republic).
According to the author, these differences can be largely attributed to the heterogeneity in the functions performed by central banks 2 .
In this context, the present paper intends to find the determinants of labor demand at central banks, and to estimate the staff that these institutions require by taking into account how they carry out their operative functions, their staff costs, and the characteristics of the economy where they operate. To this effect, 78 central banks of different regions with information from the 2000-2004 period are studied, and the staff is estimated for 66 banks on which additional information could be obtained on their staff costs.
Thus, this paper wishes to contribute to the body of literature on central banks in three major aspects. First, we identify the usual strategies developed by central banks in the performance of their operative functions. In the theoretical aspect, we construct a real wages' proxy in order to characterize the labor-demand function and to validate the assumption of the flexible budgetary restriction of central banks. Finally, as to methodology, we use a panel data model with random effects that contemplates the differences between central banks while at the same time allowing to identify the impact generated on the staff by changes introduced in their functions.
The paper is composed of four sections including this introduction. Section 2 discusses the recent evolution of central banks' staff, functions and staff costs. Section 3 describes the theoretical aspects of labor demand, reviews the empirical evidence for central banks, and the statement of the model. Also shows the results of the model and the staff estimations for central banks. Section 4 concludes.
STAFF, FUNCTIONS, AND STAFF COSTS AT CENTRAL BANKS
This section presents some facts that show how the gradual adjustment in central banks' staffs has been accompanied with changes in their operative functions and increases in staff costs. For a better comparative analysis, the selected sample was divided into three subgroups with homogeneous characteristics; two of them by similar degree of economic development, and the other one by geographic region.
EVOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL BANKS STAFF (2000 -2004)

A. Advanced Economies
This group comprises the central banks of 30 countries that share as a common characteristic a per capita income of above USD 10,000 per year, according to the classification in IMF (2005) . In this group, central banks with the highest number of employees were the FED, which after an approximately 13% reduction during the period, 
FUNCTIONS OF CENTRAL BANKS
Functions developed by central banks are directly related to a wide array of goals, the most common of which are: To preserve the internal value of the national currency, to manage the country's international reserves, to look after the country's financial stability, to secure a safe and efficient payment system, and to guarantee the issue and circulation of currency (See Fisher, 1994; De Hann and Kooi, 2000) . Several of these objectives are related to a group of functions that, due to the related activities, are labor intensive. These functions are: financial supervision, currency operations, banknotes printing, coin minting, and payment systems operation.
Since these are operational functions that, in some cases, involve a moderate degree of risk, central banks have implemented modernization strategies aimed at gathering the involvement of the private sector for their development. Recent experiences also suggest the lack of a consensus about whether central banks should or not carry out these functions or on how they should perform them, these issues depends mostly on their relationship with the government and with the financial sector as well as with their historical tradition 4 .
A. Financial Supervision
The supervision of the financial system is one of the functions that, for reasons of the country's institutional organization, has been delegated from the beginning to central banks, or has been the responsibility of a separate state-owned entity. That is why this particular function has not sustained any significant changes in its administration 5 .
There is neither a clear trend in the performance of this function nor a wide consensus on who should take care of it. However, there are some arguments in favor of central banks performing it. First, in order to fulfill its role as last-instance lenders, central banks must have first-hand and detailed information on the solvency of commercial banks, and they could perform this function more efficiently if they gathered this information directly instead of having to request it from another entity (Peek et. al., 1999) 6 . Another issue has to do with the potential scale economies that central banks may develop when they take care of that particular function, because they must monitor the movements of the financial system and for that task they usually have a Financial Stability Department (Green, 2003) .
In order to review this trend, Figure 2 
B. Currency Operations
Currency operations mainly involve cash handling, distribution, quality check, and destruction. To carry out these activities, central banks may apart themselves from the traditional model, that was characterized by the bank performing the whole activity with its own resources. More particularly, central banks may gather the partial or complete support from third parties, provided that a certain level of supervision is maintained (See Table 1 ) Figure 3 shows the percentage of central banks that carry out all or most of currency operations, mainly following the traditional model. Central banks pertaining to advanced economies show a trend toward delegating some activities related to currency operations to third parties. However, most of them still follow a traditional model (e.g., Spain, France, Italy, Germany, and US 8 ). 8 In an effort to minimise the cost of providing currency, the Federal Reserve recently issued for comments a note of a proposed policy that would involve the development of a custodial inventory program combined with a fee assessed on such cross-shipped currency (McKinley and Banaian, 2005, p.76) -Sharing Model: The central bank delegates part of these activities to a custodial entity, generally related to commercial banks or to securities transporters.
-Participative Model: The central bank acts as stockholder in a private firm that assumes most of these activities. These firms are usually created at the central bank's initiative, seeking to establish partnerships with financial entities or specialized firms.
-Freelance Operation: The central bank has a minimum participation, limiting itself only to the destruction process, and leaving to third parties (e.g., private banks) the larger currency operations (i.e., cash handling, distribution, and quality check). widely between central banks due to diverse factors (e.g., geographic, demographic, or economic). Central banks that traditionally have had a wide network of branches are those from France, Germany, Italy, the United States, and Spain. However, in the past few years several of these banks have reduced the size of their networks and will continue to do so, but without abandoning their significant regional presence 11 .
Germany's central bank has implemented a restructuring plan for its network of 11 This network reduction has been implemented as the market in the cities where the central bank used to be present have started to create the mechanisms to assume these activities either by themselves or under contracts with other firms (Baxter, et. al., 2005) . An assessing on the technical efficiency of the 37 currency operations branches of the FED in the US can be seen in Bohn et. al. (2001) . For a similar study in the central bank of Colombia, see Sarmiento (2005) .
C. Banknotes Printing and Coin Minting
Banknotes printing and coin minting are industrial functions associated with the central banks' core task of issuing currency. There are several forms to meet the cash needs of a given economy. In some countries, either the central bank or the government are in charge of cash production; whereas in other countries, the central bank purchases the currency from private firms under contract or imports it from other countries. Table 2 In the group of other developing countries, the proportion of central banks that print their own banknotes is higher than in the other two groups, although more than one half does not carry it out at all. In some cases, the government performs this activity, although it is more frequent for the government to import notes from other countries. Some central banks that import banknotes are those from Malaysia, Indonesia, Nepal, and Croatia. A different practice is that of Bulgaria's central bank, which in the year 2002 segregated its banknotes press to a subsidiary firm (Printing Woks). The Polish central bank acquires the banknotes from a local privately-owned company. 
D. Payment Systems Operation
One of central banks' major objectives is to look after the efficiency and security of payment systems. Due to the systemic risk involved in inter-bank transactions and the monetary interventions made by central banks through these mechanisms, the role central banks play in payment systems operation and supervision is central for the well performance of the economy (See, BIS, 2005a).
As to payment systems efficiency, Khiaonarong (2003) found three different approaches taken by central banks in their operation: minimalist, public, and competitive.
These approaches differ in the degree of participation of central banks and cost-recovery policy, and have an impact on the efficiency of payment systems 16 . Similarly, the author considers that payment systems should be studied independently according to the value or volume of transactions. Therefore, to the effects of this paper, the operation of retail and large-value payment systems was studied separately.
a) Retail Payment Systems
Retail payment systems (RPS) are used for minor inter-bank transferences and payments made with credit cards, debit cards and checks. Central banks differ in the operation of these systems because some of them do it directly, whereas others have established independent partnerships with financial entities, and in some others, both central banks and private entities manage their own systems and may or may not compete with each other. Whenever central banks do not operate directly the payment systems, they play an over-sighting role.
16 Classifying the sample of central banks under the three said approaches is a laborious task that requires an independent study in which we are actually working. Annex 3 describes the approaches and gives some examples for a several group of central banks.
On the other hand, RPS may be operated either manually or automatically. Manual operation, particularly when related to check clearance, is labor-intensive. However, in some countries both manual and automated RPS coexist. In many cases, automation has also resulted in changes in the administration of payment systems through the creation of associations with financial entities in which the central bank maintains a significant interest, but without using its own staff. This obeys to the necessity of sharing with the financial sector the elevated costs involved in these automation processes 19 . Examples of central banks that have ceased to operate retail 18 The central bank of Canada has delegated the operation of both retail and large-value payment systems, and has limited its role to oversight, and to provide accounts-settlement services. Since 1980 the Canadian Payments Association (CPA), conformed by financial institutions and the central bank, operates the two national payment systems: the LVTS, for large-value transactions, and the ACSS for retail transactions. The CPA operates as a non-profit organization and maintains a full cost recovery policy (Dingle, 2003) . In England the Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS) has been operating both retail and largevalue payment systems since 1985. This association is conformed by commercial banks, financial institutions, building companies, and the central bank. The APACS assumed the control of the firms CHAPS Clearing Company, BACS Ltd. and Cheque and Credit Clearing Company Ltd., which used to operate payment systems independently. Given its private nature, it follows a full cost recovery policy. Since then, the central bank has limited its functions to oversight payment systems. 19 Costs and investments involved in automating and updating payment systems are in general very high. To this respect, Khiaonarong (2005) showed that these costs were above USD $28 million in the SEACEN countries during the period 2000-2004. systems Among central banks differences are mainly presented on the processing mechanism (manual or automated) of these systems. Figure 5 shows that the proportion of central banks currently operating LVPS manually in advanced economies is very low (3,3%).
Also, it's noticeable that during the period central banks from Latin America and other developing countries initiated a strong trend towards automation 22 .
20 Differences still remain in the region on cost recovery and subsidies policies. For example, Venezuela's central bank does not charge any fee, and subsidizes all of the transactions. In Nicaragua, a symbolic fee is charged, with most of the operation being subsidized by the government, whereas in Costa Rica all operation costs are recovered through fees. In the other countries of the region cost recovery is partial (See, CEMLA, 2003) . For other differences in payment systems within the region, see Arango and Bernal (2003) . 21 Something similar occurs with the central bank of Chile, which in April 2004 implemented a real-time gross settlement system (RTGS) for operations made by the Large-value Clearing House Combanc, a company operated by commercial banks and oversighted by the central bank (For more details, see Herrera, 2006) . 22 In the Latin American region, Colombia's central bank has led the implementation of policies aimed at improving intra-day liquidity of systems operating under the RTGS system (See, Bernal and Merlano, 2005) .
Currently, only 7 out of the 78 central banks of the sample operate large-value payment systems manually. These are: Albania, Egypt, Rumania, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, and Cyprus. As with retail systems, the central bank of Cyprus is the only one operating large-value systems manually in the group of advanced economies, because it has considered this to be more efficient given the low number of transactions and the high costs involved in automation.
Also worth noting, competition for this type of payment systems between the central bank and a private agent is uncommon. The most representative case is that of the United
States, where the FED also competes with the private sector for the operation of LVPS.
Another interesting case is Argentina, where two private companies in addition to the central bank operate large-value systems. However, no direct competition exists because the central bank operates a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system, whereas private entities operate a multilateral net-off system 23 . Brazil's central bank has the highest staff costs in the whole Latin American region.
The highest increases during the period (close to 20%) occurred in Ecuador and Costa
Rica, although the latter has the lowest costs in the region. The only reduction took place at Bolivia's central bank. 25 In the case of Israel, this confirms a recent concern raised by Mr. Stanley Fisher, Governor of the Central Bank, who has led significant reforms in the contracting scheme aimed at curtailing high staff costs. One of his relevant proposals is for new employees to be engaged with wages 30% below those currently in force, a concept largely supported by a recent paper that shows that average wages in the Bank of Israel are among the highest in the whole country (Central Banking, 2005b In the group of other developing countries, Indonesia's central bank has the highest staff costs, with an increase of more than 50% during the period. However, the largest increases in the 5-year period (i.e., above 100%) occurred in Poland, Bangladesh, and Turkey, with the greatest reductions (above 15%) being those of Romania, Macedonia and Georgia. The banks with the lowest costs in this group are Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Albania.
LABOR DEMAND AT CENTRAL BANKS
This section delves deeply into the theoretical aspects of the labor-demand function and its application for central banks. Recent studies on labor demand in central banks and the estimations of the econometric model are discussed.
LABOR-DEMAND FUNCTION
The microeconomic theory indicates that labor, being a production factor, will be demanded as the demand for other goods or services increases. Therefore, the demand for labor is conceived as a derived demand since it depends on the good or service it contributes to produce or provide (McConnell et al., 2005) .
In order to verify this premise, let us assume that a firm engages two production factors: labor (L) and capital (K), in order to produce a final good (Y); with the real wage (w) and the unit cost of the capital (r), representing the relative prices of the two factors considered. Thus, for the firm to maximize benefits a minimum cost function that relates price and optimum amount of each factor should exist. This cost function will also depend on the production level and on the price of the factors:
Once the cost function is defined, demand for labor can be found by applying the Theorem of Shepard, that is, a partial differentiation of expression (1) with respect to real wage (w):
is a function of the relation between costs and output level. Since this is a short-term demand, labor is assumed to be the only variable factor. Therefore, for the purposes of the econometric estimation the equation (2) can be expressed as a log-linear function as follows (See, Hamermesh, 1993) : (3) Equation (3) shows that a firm's short-term labor demand will depend primarily on the labor-output elasticity ( 1 α ) and on the labor-real wage elasticity ( 2 α ). As will be shown hereinafter, this approach is closer to the case of the central banks.
A. Empirical Evidence
Literature on labor demand in central banks is scarce. One of the first approaches was made by Vaubel (1997) Vaubel (1997; and Banco de la República (2005) From the theoretical standpoint, the works discussed hereinabove also share their exclusion of the labor factor price to characterize the labor-demand function, under the assumption of a very low employment-wage elasticity in central banks. However, as the previous section has shown, the theory indicates that real wages should be included in the labor-demand function.
B. The Model
Following the specifications of equation (3) (4) 
C. Methodology
In order to estimate equation (4) 
RESULTS
The model stated in equation (4) was estimated through the generalized least squares (GLS) method and under the random-effects condition that results from applying
Hausman's test. For the first estimation (Model 1), coin minting (CM) and manual operation of large-value payment systems (LVPSm) variables were non-significant; moreover, they showed a wrong sing to the expected one. Therefore, a new estimation was made with the exclusion of these variables. In the new estimation (Model 2), output 28 The difference between a fixed-effects model and a random-effects model resides in that the latter adduces a random variable that changes for each individual, whereas in the former the effect is a fixed number. The selection of the model depends on the correlation between the individual effect and the explanatory variable, which is reviewed with Hausman's test (See, Hsiao, 2003) . 29 An interesting exercise would be to obtain different coefficients for all variables at each central bank by using a Swamy model. However, the number of years from which data were obtained is very short and does not allow using this type of models (See Amemiya, 1978) .
magnitude variables, i.e., GDP per capita (Y) and population (N), showed a high degree of significance 30 . Table 4 shows that of all functions, financial supervision ( The findings on the currency operations (CO) variable were consistent with both theoretical position and empirical evidence, because this function encompasses numerous 30 These results are consistent with the estimations of Vaubel (1997; and Banco de la República (2005) , which also used these variables as measures of the magnitude of central banks' output.
activities that typically are labor-intensive due to their extensive infrastructure 31 .
Likewise, the coefficient suggests that when a central bank changes the operations of this function through a traditional model for other less interventionists schemes (e.g., sharing, participative, or freelance), a significant staff reduction should be expected.
The banknote printing (BP) function was also significant, indicating this to be a relevant function for determining labor demand. This could obey to the fact that its direct operation involves a large industrial infrastructure and a trained staff devoted exclusively to this task 32 . Likewise, manual operation of retail payment systems (RPSm) was significant at 10%. This shows the impact of manual processes on these systems (e.g., manual clearing of checks). In contrast, the variable that represents automated operations of retail payment systems (RPSat) was non-significant, but showed the expected sign, suggesting that when these payment systems are automated, the staff a central bank needs is very small, although probably more specialized or highly trained.
On the other hand, the real-wage variable (W) was highly significant, and had the expected negative sign. However, the coefficient shows that labor-wage elasticity is lower in central banks than in private firms 33 . This could also suggest the presence of a certain budgetary flexibility in central banks, a feature already highlighted by Heikensten (2003) . Riksbank, 2006) associated with differences in labor productivity. Also, they might be attributable to some other factors not directly captured by the model (e.g., organizational structure, bureaucracy, technology and staff qualification), but related with the staff size.
ESTIMATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
A. Advanced Economies
Estimation Table 5 and Annex 6).
B. Latin America
The However, central bank staff reductions were accompanied by an increase in their costs, which could be largely attributed to a higher degree of specialization of the staff, often resulting from their focusing on their core functions. Overall, as central banks cease to perform operative functions, they will require less low-qualified personnel, resulting in an increase in the ratio of highly qualified employees and, in the short term, in higher staff costs.
In We deem that these findings are highly relevant for central banks, governments, and central banking organizations. Likewise, we recognize that this paper could be extended and delve deeply into several other directions. In particular, efficiency measures by functions should be estimated in order to identify the best practices for central banks.
With this purpose, part of our research agenda is focused on measuring efficiency by functions, comparing central banks with different efficient-frontier techniques.
Annex 1.
Percent Staff Variation in Selected Central Banks (1993-2004)
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Central Bank Directory (1993, 2004) Of the three groups of countries, Latin America is the region where the cultural activity developed by central banks is more notorious due to the historical and political legacy of their governments. Since their establishment, most central banks in the region were given the responsibility of approaching people through cultural activities because of the lack of state policies on this matter. The majority of these central banks have at least one library open to the public, either specialized in economic matters, or of general purpose, that include social, artistic, and historic works.
However, the only central banks in these countries that maintain a significant network of libraries are those from Guatemala, with 53, and Colombia with 19. Likewise, the 6 museums of Ecuador and the 8 museums managed by the central bank in Colombia are worth noting. It is important to say that some central banks, such as those of Guatemala, Bolivia, and Costa Rica, have chosen to assign the administration of their libraries or museums to non-profit organizations to which the central banks only contribute with financial resources. Source: Central Banks Annual Reports (2000 Annex 3.
Payment Systems Operation at the Central Banks Khiaonarong (2003) identified three approaches to how central banks operate payment systems. These approaches differ primarily in the degree of participation of the private sector and the existence of a cost-recovery policy. For a better understanding of this classification, the following table shows some examples of countries that fall within each approach.
Approaches in the Payment Systems Operation Approach Central Bank Participation Cost Recovery Policy Examples
The central bank owns and operates only largevalue payment systems or limits itself to providing account settlement services.
The private sector operates low-value systems, generally through commercial banks associations. As to labor-intensive secondary and operational functions, the BR performs, mostly with its own resources, four out of the five core functions analyzed in this paper. Financial supervision is the only function not under the responsibility of the central bank because since 1923 it is performed by a state-owned entity (Financial Superintendence).
As to currency operations, BR follows primarily a traditional model. However, freelance and sharing models have been implemented in some cities, thus promoting the participation of securities transporting firms. These changes, aimed at increasing efficiency, have resulted in a reduction of the bank's network of branches associated to this function since 1997.
With respect to industrial activities such as coin minting and banknote printing, these are performed directly by BR. Recently, the Central de Efectivo, a complex with top facilities for the production of banknotes and currency operations related activities, very similar to Portugal's Carregado complex, came into operation. As to coin minting, BR redesigned and enhanced the process in its Fabrica de Moneda, which currently operates with a minimal staff (30 employees) and a rotary that has resulted in an improved productivity of this function.
BR manages directly fully automated large-value and retail payment systems, thus being one of the first central banks in Latin America in having automated these processes to date. These changes resulted in significant staff reductions, more particularly in labor-intensive activities such as manual clearing of checks. Likewise, reforms implemented since the end of the 90's allowed for a deeper capital market and for more efficient and safe payment systems financial management in Colombia (For more details, see Bernal and Merlano, 2005; Uribe, 2005a) .
On the other hand, cultural promotion is one of BR's major responsibilities toward the community. BR has never had doubts on the continuity of this function due to its high social impact. In fact, BR is the central bank with the widest infrastructure and largest staff devoted to cultural activities in the entire central banks environment. BR operates a network of 18 libraries in the national territory, plus a main library located in Bogotá, which has the largest number of books among the libraries of all central banks (1,500,000 books). Additionally, BR operates an ethnographic museum and seven gold museums in the whole country. Similarly, BR organizes a continual program composed of diverse musical and artistic activities distributed in 15 branches and 12 cultural agencies (See, Uribe, 2005b) .
In fact, the percentage of employees devoted to these activities as of December 31 st 2004 accounted for 15.7% (392 employees) of the total Bank's staff, this being the most numerous staff of all central banks developing some cultural activity. Since the proportion of cultural activities developed by BR is not comparable with other central banks, and since this function is not taken into account within the econometric model, employees devoted to these tasks are excluded from the data on the BR's staff. Model estimates for BR for the years 2000 to 2004 are illustrated in the following figure: 
